

The Dialogical Self in the First Two Years of Life

Embarking on a Journey of Discovery

Alan Fogel and Ilse de Koeyer

UNIVERSITY OF UTAH

Francesca Bellagamba

UNIVERSITY OF ROME 'LA SAPIENZA'

Holly Bell

UNIVERSITY OF UTAH

ABSTRACT. The first aim of this paper is to present a theory of development of the dialogical self in which change originates in creative innovations during intrapersonal and interpersonal dialogues that highlight the self (Fogel, 1993, 2001b). Dialogues form into regularly recurring routines, called frames, that are either creative (changing, developing) or rigid (unchanging). Second, we argue that there is a non-verbal form of the dialogical self that first appears in early infancy. Finally, we show how the dialogical self develops systematically over the first 18 months of life by presenting a case study of some creative and rigid frames of one infant girl and her mother.

KEY WORDS: creativity, development, embodiment, frame, infancy

The concept of the dialogical self in adults (Hermans & Kempen, 1993) has some of the following features. First, the dialogical self is composed of multiple I-positions, each of which interacts with the others and each of which has a unique perspective on the person's experience.

The *I* has the possibility to move, as in space, from one position to the other in accordance with changes in situation and time. . . . The *I* in one position can agree, disagree, understand, misunderstand, oppose, contradict, question and even ridicule the *I* in another position. (Hermans, Kempen, & van Loon, 1992, pp. 28–29)

Second, this statement suggests that the I-positions occupy an embodied real or imaginary time and space. Each embodied I-position has a unique

psychological quality in addition to a unique spatial perspective, perhaps originating from previous experiences and the voices of significant others (Bruner, 1990; Fogel, 1995; Hermans & Kempen, 1993; Shotter, 1984).

Third, the self is inherently social because the real or imagined I-positions can discourse with each other: 'It is not individual "I"s who create relationships, but relationships that create the sense of "I" . . . "I" am just an I by virtue of playing a particular part in a relationship' (Gergen, 1991, p. 157). Philosophers of intersubjectivity also propose that self and other arise as a result of dialogue (Buber, 1958; de Quincey, 1998; Jopling, 1993; Levinas, 1969). As speakers attempt to clarify their perspective to listeners, that point of view becomes clearer to the speakers themselves (Hermans & Kempen, 1993).

The first aim of this paper is to show how dialogues form into regularly recurring routines, called frames, that are either creative (changing, developing) or rigid (unchanging). We propose that there is development of the dialogical self as change originates in creative innovations during intra-personal and interpersonal dialogues that highlight the self (Fogel, 1993, 2001b). Second, we argue that there is a non-verbal form of the dialogical self that first appears in early infancy. Finally, we show how the dialogical self develops systematically over the first 18 months of life by presenting a case study of some creative and rigid frames of one infant girl and her mother.

Creative and Rigid Frames

An understanding of dialogical processes may help one to appreciate how the dialogical self develops. All dialogues, real or imagined, in infants and adults, form into regularly recurring routines, or frames, for coordinated mutual action. *Frames* are stable patterns of mutually coordinated activity related to the topic, setting and scope of the dialogue (Bateson, 1955; Fogel, 1993; Goffman, 1974). Frames are similar to the concepts of narrative themes and narrative coherence used to describe adult dialogue and writing. Frames are interaction rituals such as greeting and leave-taking, plots or themes of narratives, social games and patterned conflicts such as couple arguments about particular topics. Frames have a life history in a relationship. They can be verbal or non-verbal. They require maintenance by participants to remain alive and rejuvenation or letting go when they begin to fall apart (Baxter, 1994; Fogel, 1993; Wilmot, 1994).

Recurrences of the same frame over time within a relationship, while showing regularities, are never exactly the same. There is almost always some variability because participants co-construct their communication on-line; more like improvisation than like following a script. Frames that are

relatively similar and unchanging over repeated instances are relatively more rigid, while frames that change over time are relatively more creative.

In order to co-regulate with another person in the typical on-line fashion of most spontaneous face-to-face discourse, people must continually readjust their actions on the basis of the continually changing actions of their partners. In addition to the mechanics of mutual coordination in communication, there is also the dynamics of creativity required to 'keep up' or 'stay in' the dialogue that is continually unfolding. Part of the dialogue is determined by past experience of the regularity of the frame, as when friends meet regularly for lunch together and tend to talk about certain kinds of topics (i.e. careers, romantic relationships, children, etc.). Another part of the dialogue is indeterminate, as when people disclose something about themselves they had not planned to discuss or when people discover something new about themselves or their partners as a result of the dialogue (Fogel, 1993; Ganguly, 1976; Whitehead, 1978).

The individual's awareness or experience of I-positions, that part of the dialogue that specifies the self, can occur within both creative and rigid frames. People can feel themselves as active, positioned, embodied agents, taking one or another role or perspective. Within a creative frame, people can experience themselves as creatively building a consensus, working through disagreements or moving toward peak emotional moments with their partners. When individuals are constrained within rigid frames, they experience their I-positions as willfully resisting or deliberately coercing their partners. They may also take the position of passively submitting or resigning themselves to a hopeless situation.

Rigid frames limit the opportunities for growth. Creative frames enhance self development. During participation in creative frames, the self is not an experience of being but an experience of becoming, a process of improvisational co-activity with potentially infinite possibilities for self discovery (Bakhtin, 1988; Barclay, 1994; Boesch, 1991; Bosma, 1995; Csikszentmihályi, 1990; Dewey, 1934; Hermans & Kempen, 1993; Josephs, 1998; Levinas, 1969; Shotter, 1981). Creative frames, therefore, are the locus of self developmental change.

The Dialogical Self in Infancy

Each of the main features of the dialogical self—multiplicity of I-positions, embodiment of situated I-positions, and intersubjectivity as constitutive of the dialogue between I-positions—can be observed in pre-verbal infants during communication frames. The theory of the dialogical self was developed using theory and data on adults. It relies on narrative and literary theory as well as clinical case studies (see Bakhtin, 1988; Bruner, 1990; Harré, 1988; Hermans & Hermans-Jansen, in press; Sarbin, 1986). Infants

during the first two years of life, however, participate in situated non-verbal dialogues with other people, with the world of objects and with their experiences of themselves.

Recent discoveries suggest that self-awareness can be directly perceived from the first days of life and perhaps during the late fetal period. The neurophysiology of perception requires that individuals must perceive themselves, their spatial and temporal location, in order to be able to locate and identify an object (Gibson, 1966) such that what is 'there' is always in some dialogical relationship with what is 'here'. Infants in the first six months can distinguish between the movements of their own bodies and the movements of other people and objects. At around 5 months, infants begin to perceive the hand as a visual entity that 'belongs' to the self by comparing the limits of the hand's trajectory with that of the environmental background while at the same time feeling the hand proprioceptively with respect to intentional movements. The infant's psychological experience of the hand, from the hand's proprioceptive and tactile perspective, is one I-position. The infant's psychological experience of viewing the hand, from the proprioceptive and visual perspective of the eyes and head, is another I-position.

Reasoning in this manner, we can see that even newborns may have a dialogical self as they touch their own heads in a systematic sequence, beginning with the mouth, moving to the face, the ear, nose and eyes. Infants under 6 months can also sense the location and posture of the body with respect to gravity and have some sense of their own past history, as shown in studies of infant memory (Butterworth, 1995; Fogel, 1995; Legerstee, Anderson, & Schaffer, 1998; Rochat, 1995; Stern, 1985).

The infant's self dialogues are necessarily positioned since infants can only address the world from the small number of postures and locations that they are capable of assuming on their own or with help. The infant's dialogues are necessarily embodied because the infant has little or no representational or imaginary cognition prior to the second birthday. The infant's experience is filled up, so to speak, with the body: its locations, movements, senses and emotions. Infant dialogues are necessarily social since infants cannot survive without nearly constant care, support, monitoring and non-verbal discourse with adults and older children. Even objects are brought into the infant's field of view and reach space by another person. In other words, infants experience their self-dialogues within communication frames.

From the first days of life, the infant's intrapersonal self dialogues are intertwined with interpersonal dialogues, which has led many scholars of infancy to reject the notion of an 'autistic' or 'individual' sense of self in early infancy, as postulated in some early versions of psychoanalytic theory (see Stern, 1985, for a discussion of these views and their alternatives). Recent research suggests that young infants experience 'primary intersubjectivity', in which the self emerges as part of a mutually regulated

exchange between infant and adult (Trevarthen & Hubley, 1978). In the second half of the first year, 'secondary intersubjectivity' arises. Infants now become able to refer to distant objects and events and to their own feelings during communication frames (Stern, 1985). After 12 months of age, this form of intersubjectivity becomes increasingly symbolic (Camaioni, Aureli, Bellagamba, & Fogel, in press).

Illustrative Case Study: Susan and Her Mother

In this section we present a case study of 'Susan' and her mother, who were videotaped during free play every two weeks, beginning when the infant was 1 month and continuing until 24 months. We will give examples from the developmental periods between 0 and 6 months, 6 and 12 months, and 12 and 18 months of age.

During the first six months, Susan experiences different parts of her body as they dialogue with each other using self-touching, self-seeing and sound making, all of which are embedded within social dialogues with the mother. During the next six months, Susan becomes aware of the intentionality of her I-positions by asking for help, taking the initiative in social play, showing off and hiding and escaping. Infants of this age also begin to communicate affection, fear and loneliness in the dialogue of approach and avoidance, separation and reunion. During the period between 12 and 18 months, Susan becomes aware of the potential for consensus and conflict of her I-positions in relation to those of other people. Infants of this age use words and gestures such as 'no', deliberately disobey and participate in cooperative play. All of this occurs *before the age of 18 months*, the age at which infants begin to recognize their own image in a mirror and are first observed using the word 'I'.

Two types of frames between Susan and her mother will be examined and discussed for each of these three developmental periods: creative and rigid. During creative frames, Susan and her mother explore and expand meanings potentially related to the self. During rigid frames, Susan and her mother seem to oppose each other and there is not much room for innovation. We will highlight how the self is inherently multivocal, embodied and social in this age period (Hermans et al., 1992).

Expanding Horizons: The Dialogical Self between 0 and 6 Months

The term 'I-position' for the young infant is the infant's experience of each of the multiple sensory modalities that compose her world. Information from the eyes, ears, nose, mouth and limbs creates a dialogue that is unique to the individual perspective of the infant. She is an iridescent palette of sensory stimuli. Each novel sensory experience interacts to co-create a vibrant

spectrum. The infant utilizes this vivid integration to interpret her experiences and color her world. This dialogue between multiple I-positions is fundamental for the development of the infant's embodied self, in relation to her environment.

Example: Creative frame (age 2 months, 1 week). In the following segments, Susan demonstrates several levels of coordination between these sensory I-positions. As she integrates these positions, she becomes aware of herself in her body. Mother serves as an amplifier, facilitating integration of the infant's sensory dialogue through social dialogue. She accomplishes this effortlessly as if coordinated in a choreographed dance with her infant. Mother helps to create an innovative composition of the infant's experience.

Susan is lying in a supine position on the floor, looking at mother. Mother is speaking softly, melodically to infant while slowly shaking a rattle back and forth above her. The mood is serene. Mother says, 'Your sister Jane is here watching you today. She wanted to see what we do when we come here.' Susan touches the rattle with one hand and touches her face with the other.

Here, Susan is processing multiple embodied positions within herself. She experiences different forms of proprioceptive feedback through the sensation of one hand touching her face and the other touching the rattle. The rattle and face are in different locations in space in relation to the infant's body (i.e. left vs right, face vs hand). In addition, the experience of each position is colored by Susan's attention to mother visually, audibly, and tactually as she makes contact with the rattle. Susan's experience of her mother acts as an additional I-position for the infant through social dialogue.

This is further illustrated by the following example in which Susan is making visual distinctions between herself and objects by alternating her gaze between the different spatial positions of mother and rattle. Susan feels sensations differently through her mouth compared to her hands, so that each of these sensory organs has a different location in physical and psychological space.

Mother continues by shaking the rattle back and forth. Susan looks down at the rattle, then back up at mother. Susan touches her trunk with her right hand, while holding her left arm straight up in the air. Susan then grasps her hands together and mouths them.

In the next example, mother continues to validate the infant's self exploration by helping to maintain a creative frame.

Susan reaches up with both hands. She reaches for the toy with her left hand and touches her trunk with her right. She looks at mother and a small grin stretches across her mouth. Mother leans in closer, 'Are you gonna give me a smile?' Susan's smile broadens and she stretches her arm out to

her side. She looks satisfied with herself and exudes a sense of achievement. Mother tickles Susan's torso and raises the frequency of her voice as she commends infant, 'Good girl, good girl.'

Note again the multiple spatial positions of the toy, trunk and mother. Mother's position appears closer now and Susan reaches her arms up to bridge the distance between them. Emotions arising within Susan suggest that the maternal spatial location vis-à-vis Susan also corresponds to a psychological process that differs from the psychological experience of the toy and trunk I-positions. Those latter positions are also enriched inter-subjectively as mother amplifies Susan's emotions and physical expressions by modulating her vocal intonation and by tickling Susan's torso. Mother also amplifies the torso position by tickling, thus giving that position a sense of both a spatial and psychological uniqueness.

Example: Rigid frame (age 4 months, 1 week). Sometimes mother and infant are unable to coordinate their respective agendas. In the following example, Susan is met with resistance from her mother when she attempts to exert physical autonomy and roll over onto her stomach. Mother attempts to appease the infant in the supine position but Susan has her own sense about what will appease her.

In an attempt to retrieve the toy porcupine from the supine position, Susan turns onto her belly. Her expression in this position exudes a sense of accomplishment through achieving a new perspective on her environment. Mother turns Susan back over to a supine position. Susan is not pleased by this and is now fussing, crying, and squirming around. Mother shakes the toy lock and key over Susan's torso. Susan looks at it and reaches up for it. Susan is quiet momentarily as she is touching the lock. Her satisfaction with the toy is interspersed with fussing, crying, kicking, rubbing her feet, and extending her legs. Susan frequently looks over to the side in the direction that she rolled over.

Note the contrasts in spatial orientation, emotion, and intersubjective processes between the prone and supine positions. Mother is trying to appease Susan with the lock and key in an apologetic manner. She increases the intensity with which she offers objects at her disposal to calm her. She seems to realize that by thwarting Susan's objective to remain on her stomach, she accepts partial responsibility for Susan's reaction. The dialogical relation between prone and supine is highlighted by Susan's defiance. This emerging frame of opposition sets the stage, in Susan's dialogical self, for subsequent opposition in the mother—infant dialogue.

Mother squeaks the toy caterpillar at a regular rate against Susan's mouth. Susan places her hands on the caterpillar and she looks at mother. Mother says, 'Hi sweetie,' and touches Susan's nose. Susan removes her hands from her face and the caterpillar and starts to cry. Susan is extremely reactive at this point. Susan reaches over for a toy, and then flips to her

tummy. Mother is watching and exclaims, 'There you did it . . . right over on your tummy.' Susan looks around at the toys mother has spread before her. She exhibits the same reaction as the first occasion when she rolled onto her stomach. She looks very satisfied with herself for accomplishing what she had been attempting to achieve throughout the entire session.

Susan expresses a feeling of frustration when she is unable to explore her physical realm. She elicits a sense of ambivalence as she briefly interacts with mother and the toy, only to retreat away from social engagement. The conflicting I-positions within Susan that appeared in the previous rigid frame are transformed within a more creative frame in which the prone I-position becomes more psychologically positive.

A World of Discovery: The Dialogical Self between 6 and 12 Months

In the second half of the first year, the infant is much like an explorer, setting sail to new horizons. She makes one of the biggest discoveries humans can achieve: that she has a unique perspective on the world, which is at the same time shareable with other human beings. This 'quantum leap' in development (Stern, 1985) is embedded within communication frames with care-givers.

Example: Creative frame (9 months, 1 week). In the following example, a creative dialogue is shown between various I-positions of the infant embedded within a creative social dialogue with the mother. Susan is pounding the table, while mother is commenting and participating. Although the infant and her mother have engaged in this frame for several months, this time it is different. Her intense and prolonged gaze, alternating between her own hand and mother's eyes and hand, suggest that Susan has discovered that she has a unique perspective that she can share with her mother.

Susan sits in the high chair with mother opposite her. As mother taps the table, Susan turns her head to watch mother's hands. Mother says, 'Show mama how you pound.' Susan looks straight into mother's eyes. Mother repeats the same sentence in a rhythmic fashion, as if she is pounding. The infant starts to pound the table with a faint smile on her face. Mother exclaims, 'YEAH! That's a good girl!' and starts smiling too. Susan starts to alternate between looking at her own and at mother's pounding hand. She starts hitting the table more and more vigorously while looking intently at her hands. Again, she alternates between looking at mother's hand and her own hand. Then, she grabs mother's hand and watches it closely. She looks at its palm, turns it upside down, puts it palm-down on the table and turns it back up. Then, she drops it. She lifts up both arms, hits them forcefully on the table and shouts, 'Ah!' Mother smiles while she softly repeats the infant's 'Ah.' Susan rests her hands and head on the side of the chair.

Susan's I-positions are still clearly embodied. However, for the first time she takes distance from her direct experience by comparing her own experience with that of the mother. By alternating her gaze between her own pounding hand and mother's, she seems to notice that her and her mother's experiences are similar yet different. Seeing and hearing her own hand goes together with sensations in the muscles of her arm and in the palm of her hand. Seeing and hearing mother's hand in the same way is not connected to such sensations. Even though mother is part of the infant's dialogue with herself, she does live in a different body. The infant may learn: 'I am different than you are, yet we are similar and can share experiences.'

The mother amplifies the dialogue between embodied I-positions by imitating the infant's actions and rhythm with her hand and her voice. Her actions are intrinsically interwoven with the infant's. Upon repeating this frame over time, Susan may start experiencing the mother as being 'there', even when she is alone (Stern, 1985). Stern has called the mother in this case an 'evoked companion', a metaphor that clearly suggests an 'evoked dialogue'. What may become salient are the creative dynamics of the dialogue, and the emergent emotions that co-arise (Fogel, 2001b).

Example: Rigid frame (8 months, 1 week). When mother-infant frames are more rigid, the self dialogue in the absence of the mother might become less dynamic. Such a process is illustrated in the next example. Susan and her mother are on the floor, surrounded by toys. Both mother and infant persist in being focused on their own actions. This pattern of opposing wills occurs repeatedly, although infrequently, in the relationship between Susan and her mother.

Mother has been trying unsuccessfully to interest Susan in 'reading' a picture book. She tries again when the infant sits with her back turned to mother. Mother holds the book in front of the infant but Susan does not look at it. She continues mouthing and looking at other toys. Mother persists, 'NOW we can look at this book. See? An egg . . .' Her arms are so tight around the infant that Susan falls against mother's body. However, she seems unperturbed, as by any of the mother's actions. It is as if they are living in separate worlds. Mother continues, 'orange juice, and peanut butter . . .' Susan tries to grab her toy and makes the book fall out of mother's hands. Still, she does not look at it. The pattern repeats itself until mother puts the book away and says, 'Boy, you are really focused.' As mother starts retracting the book, Susan looks at it and reaches for it. Mother puts the book on the infant's lap. When Susan starts to mouth it, mother exclaims, 'Hey! We were going to look at the pictures, honey. Don't eat the book!' Susan takes the book out of her mouth and moves it away.

As in the previous example, a dialogue is unfolding between the infant's embodied I-positions (the eyes, hands, voice, etc.). This time, Susan gets to know herself in opposition to the mother. Mother is not amplifying

I-positions but is restricting them: when she brings the book into Susan's visual field, the infant looks away. When mother retracts the book, Susan looks at it. The flow of communication is restrained by this pattern. Upon repetition of this frame, she may learn, 'I am different than you, in a way that can't be shared' (Stern, 1985).

New Potentials for Consensus and Conflict: The Dialogical Self between 12 and 18 Months

Between 12 and 18 months the infant is taking the helm and embarking on her personal journey. Sometimes she sails along with mother. Other times she steers away from mother. She becomes increasingly aware that her own inner world (bodily sensations, feelings, emotions, and will) is something distinct from the outside world and from the inner world of other people, and that communicating about it can be both challenging and pleasurable. This period is characterized by an active expression, exploration, and experimentation of new potentials, boundaries and limits of the self in the relationship (Fogel, 2001a).

Example: Creative frame (age 17 months, 2 weeks). In the following example, the dialogue is creative and co-regulated. Susan and her mother have played the lion game many times in the past. In previous sessions, mother has always played the role of the agent, the lion (donning a lion hand puppet and roaring, scaring, tickling, etc.). Susan has always played the role of the recipient (being scared, being tickled, etc.). In this session, for the first time Susan tries to put the lion puppet on her own hand with the help of her mother and she activates it, as if to scare the mother.

Mother and Susan are sitting on the floor. Mother hides the lion and Susan follows the lion, looking for it. Suddenly, the 'lion' comes out of his hiding place and 'roars!' Susan screams and steps back. She stares at the lion for a few seconds. She then abruptly grabs the puppet from the mother's hand and tries to pull it off. The mother resists and makes the lion move and scream, 'No! No!' After a short and playful fight, Susan is able to slip the puppet off mother's hand. She smiles and explores the puppet. She turns it around looking for the opening to put her hand in. The mother comments, 'Oh, *you* are gonna do it!' Mother helps her to put the lion on her hand. Susan smiles and says, 'Roar!' Mother laughs and comments, 'Scare mom.' Susan then carefully observes the lion. She turns the lion toward her own face and makes it open its mouth. She first smiles and then watches the lion, astonished. She looks surprised and a little confused. The mother intervenes: 'Ahh! You scared me!' Susan then moves the lion toward mother and says, 'Roar!' while smiling. Mother pretends to be scared, screams, and then comments, 'Scare mommy.'

During this episode, Susan is experimenting and playing with new I-positions and their corresponding emotions: being frightened if you are

followed by a lion, being frightening if you are playing the lion. She explores them as she physically embodies the lion with her hand. She uses her hand to activate the puppet. In this way, she traverses from the role of the child to the role of the lion-adult, and vice versa. Susan is now able to imagine and act in both roles, although she seems to get confused. A new voice exchanges information with the old one, resulting in a more complex and narratively structured self.

Susan's ability to take distance from her own perspective and assume a new one now involves imagination beyond perception. She is still using her body by moving toward and away from the lion, putting the puppet on her hand and opening and closing her hand so the lion's mouth moves. New imaginary I-positions arise in concert with the engagement of the body. This is the first time that such an imaginary voice arises.

The presence and the voice of the mother constitute a fundamental pole of the dialogue. In the absence of the mother and of her voice, Susan may not have been able to go through this process of self exploration. The history of this relational frame allows Susan to imitate the mother in the role of the lion, to imagine and to shift from one I-position to the other. Susan and her mother continue this game several times in future sessions, with new variations and innovations, as a playful way to exercise and expand different perspectives on the self.

Example: Rigid frame (age 15 months, 2 weeks). In the following example, Susan and her mother seem engaged in a battle of wills. Susan wants to climb up the slope of the slide. Her mother wants her to climb up from the steps. This circular episode repeats itself several times without many variations, through several sessions.

Susan and her mother are playing with the slide. Susan attempts to climb up the slope. Mother resolutely intervenes, 'No, Susan, no! Don't climb up the slide like that!' Susan looks at her mother and continues her behavior. Mother catches Susan by the arm and says, 'Come on, walk around!' Susan appears to understand mother's prohibition but she continues to climb up from the same side. Mother raises her voice saying, 'No, no, no!' as she holds Susan, bringing her forcefully to the opposite side of the slide. Susan starts screaming and wriggling. She arches her body, shakes her head to say 'no' and throws herself on the floor. Mother stops holding her and Susan walks right back to the slope. Before climbing, Susan turns around and stares at her mother's face, as if to see her reaction. Mother, in anger, says again, 'No, don't!' Susan persists in attempting to climb the slope.

In this episode, Susan and her mother are closely monitoring and influencing each other; the rigid I-position assumed by Susan mirrors the rigid I-position assumed by mother. It appears as if mother's prohibitions strengthen Susan's tendency to get her way. The two positions or voices of the dialogue in this episode are fixed and rigid; the opportunity to play with

them or to reverse them is used by neither. Susan manifests her will to move and explore the slide through her body movements (e.g. walking to the slope, arching her back in opposition). Mother forces Susan to comply by restraining her.

What is new in this developmental period is that Susan is increasingly aware of mother's intentions (rules and expectations). She anticipates mother's reaction and monitors it while doing what mother does not want her to do. In this way, she seems to challenge her mother.

Conclusions

In this paper, we have presented evidence suggesting that there is a dialogical self from the first days of life and that the dialogical self develops systematically over the first 18 months. In the absence of the complexities of verbal positioning within historical, cultural, linguistic and personal layers of meaning, infants can teach us about how the dynamics of experiencing our non-verbal embodied positions may underlie all later forms of verbal discourse (Fogel, 2001a; Lakoff & Johnson, 1999; Yasuo, 1987). Infants can also teach us about how the self grows in complexity and scope during the first two years of life, which may serve as a model for later self development processes. Individual differences in the embodiment of self dialogues in infancy may form predispositions toward particular adult developmental pathways that lead to personality differences and psychopathologies (Freud, 1926/1953; Lewis, 1995; Stern, 1985; Winnicott, 1971).

We have proposed that the dialogical self develops during frames in which mutual creativity occurs, since these are the times when new I-positions can be highlighted by some social or intrapersonal dialogical process. While rigid frames are a part of all relationships, too much rigidity (when relationships and selves stagnate, become routine or painful) is less conducive to development than a more even and dynamic balance between creativity and rigidity (Fogel, 1993; Fogel & Lyra, 1997).

References

- Bakhtin, M.M. (1988). Discourse in the novel. In N. Mercer (Ed.), *Language and literacy from an educational perspective, Vol. 1* (pp. 47–57). Philadelphia, PA: Open University Press.
- Barclay, C.R. (1994). Composing protoselves through improvisation. In U. Neisser & R. Fivush (Eds.), *The remembering self: Construction and accuracy in the self-narrative*. (pp. 55–77). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Bateson, G. (1955). The message: 'This is play'. In B. Schaffner (Ed.), *Group processes, Vol. 2* (pp. 39–66). Madison, NJ: Madison Printing Co.
- Baxter, L.A. (1994). A dialogic approach to relationship maintenance. In D.J. Canary & L. Stafford (Eds.), *Communication and relational maintenance* (pp. 233–254). San Diego, CA: Academic Press.

- Boesch, E.E. (1991). *Symbolic action theory and cultural psychology*. New York: Springer.
- Bosma, H. (1995). Identity and identity processes: What are we talking about? In A. Oosterwegel & R.A. Wicklund (Eds.), *The self in European and North American culture: Development and processes* (pp. 5–17). Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic.
- Bruner, J.S. (1990). *Acts of Meaning*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Buber, M. (1958). *I and thou* (R.G. Smith, Trans.). New York: Scribners.
- Butterworth, G. (1995). An ecological perspective on the origins of self. In J.L. Bermudez, A. Marcel, & N. Eilan (Eds.), *The body and the self*. (pp. 87–105). Cambridge, MA: Bradford.
- Camaioni, L., Aureli, T., Bellagamba, F., & Fogel, A. (in press). A longitudinal examination of the transition to symbolic communication in the second year of life. *Infant and Child Development*.
- Csikszentmihályi, M. (1990). *Flow: The psychology of optimal experience*. New York: Harper & Row.
- de Quincey, C. (1998). Engaging presence. *Noetic Sciences Review*, 45, 24–27.
- Dewey, J. (1934). *Art as experience*. New York: Perigee.
- Fogel, A. (1993). *Developing through relationships: Origins of communication, self, and culture*. Hemel Hempstead: Harvester Wheatsheaf; Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
- Fogel, A. (1995). Relational narratives of the pre-linguistic self. In P. Rochat (Ed.), *The self in early infancy: Theory and research* (pp. 117–139). Amsterdam: Elsevier North Holland.
- Fogel, A. (2001a). *Infancy: Infant, family and society* (4th ed.). Belmont, CA: Wadsworth.
- Fogel, A. (2001b). A relational perspective on the development of self and emotion. In H.A. Bosma & E.S. Kunnen (Eds.), *Identity and emotions: A self-organizational perspective*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Fogel, A., & Lyra, M. (1997). Dynamics of development in relationships. In F. Masterpasqua & P. Perna (Eds.), *The psychological meaning of chaos: Self-organization in human development and psychotherapy* (pp. 75–94). Washington, DC: American Psychological Association.
- Freud, S. (1953). *Inhibitions, symptoms and anxiety*. In J. Strachey (Ed. and Trans.), *The standard edition of the complete psychological works of Sigmund Freud, Vol. 20*. London: Hogarth. (Original work published 1926.)
- Ganguly, S.N. (1976). Communication, identity, and human development. *Communication*, 2, 221–244.
- Gergen, K.J. (1991). *The emergence of the relational self*. New York: Basic Books.
- Gibson, J.J. (1966). *The senses considered as perceptual systems*. Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin.
- Goffman, E. (1974). *Frame analysis: An essay on the organization of experience*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Harré, R. (1988). *The social construction of emotions*. New York: Blackwell.
- Hermans, H.J.M., & Hermans-Jansen, E. (in press). Dialogical processes and the development of the self. In J. Valsiner & K.J. Connolly (Eds.), *Handbook of developmental psychology*. London: Sage.

- Hermans, H.J.M., & Kempen, H.J.G. (1993). *The dialogical self: Meaning as movement*. San Diego, CA: Academic Press.
- Hermans, H.J.M., Kempen, K.J.G., & Van Loon, R.J.P. (1992). The dialogical self: Beyond individualism and rationalism. *American Psychologist*, 47, 28–29.
- Jopling, D. (1993). Cognitive science, other minds and the philosophy of dialogue. In U. Neisser (Ed.), *The perceived self* (pp. 290–309). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Josephs, I.E. (1998). Constructing one's self in the city of the silent: Dialogue, symbols, and the role of 'as-if' in self development. *Human Development*, 41, 180–195.
- Lakoff, G., & Johnson, M. (1999). *Philosophy in the flesh: The embodied mind and its challenges to western thought*. New York: Basic Books.
- Legerstee, M., Anderson, D., & Schaffer, A. (1998). Five- and eight-month-old infants recognize their faces and voices as familiar and social stimuli. *Child Development*, 69, 37–50.
- Levinas, E. (1969). *Totality and infinity: An essay on exteriority* (A. Lingos, Trans.). Pittsburgh, PA: Duquesne University Press.
- Lewis, M. (1995). Cognition–emotion feedback and the self-organization of developmental paths. *Human Development*, 38, 71–102.
- Rochat, P. (1995). Early objectification of the self. In P. Rochat (Ed.), *The self in early infancy: Theory and research* (pp. 53–72). Amsterdam: Elsevier Science.
- Sarbin, T.R. (1986). *Narrative psychology: The storied nature of human conduct*. New York: Praeger.
- Shotter, J. (1981). Vico, moral worlds, accountability, and personhood. In P. Heelas & A. Lock (Eds.), *Indigenous psychologies: The anthropology of the self* (pp. 266–284). New York: Academic Press.
- Shotter, J. (1984). *Social accountability and selfhood*. Oxford/New York: Blackwell.
- Stern, D.N. (1985). *The interpersonal world of the infant: A view from psychoanalysis and developmental psychology*. New York: Basic Books.
- Trevarthen, C., & Hubley, P. (1978). Secondary intersubjectivity: Confidence, confiding and acts of meaning in the first year. In A. Lock (Ed.), *Action, gesture and symbol: The emergence of language* (pp. 183–227). New York: Academic Press.
- Whitehead, A.N. (1978). *Process and reality: An essay in cosmology*. New York: Free Press.
- Wilmot, W.W. (1994). Relationship rejuvenation. In D.J. Canary & L. Stafford (Eds.), *Communication and relational maintenance* (pp. 255–273). San Diego, CA: Academic Press.
- Winnicott, D. (1971). *Playing and reality*. New York: Basic Books.
- Yasuo, Y. (1987). *The body: Toward an eastern mind–body theory*. Albany: State University of New York Press.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS. This work was supported by a grant to Alan Fogel from the United States National Institute of Mental Health (R01 MH57669), and by a Fulbright Fellowship to Francesca Bellagamba. We gratefully thank Andréa Pantoja and Cory Secrist for their helpful comments on this paper.

ALAN FOGEL, PhD, is a Professor of Psychology at the University of Utah. Among his publications are *Developing through Relationships* (University of Chicago Press, 1993), *Infancy: Infant, Family, and Society* (4th ed., Wadsworth, 2001), *Handbook of Infant Development* (Blackwell, 2001) and many scholarly papers published in a wide range of books and journals. Fogel's current work includes studies of the development of embodied and emotional self-awareness in infants and the formation of lasting individual differences based on early childhood experience. More information can be found at www.psych.utah.edu/alan_fogels_infant_lab. ADDRESS: Department of Psychology, University of Utah, 390 S. 1530 E., Room 502, Salt Lake City, UT 84112-0251, USA. [email: alan.fogel@psych.utah.edu]

ILSE DE KOEYER received her master's degree in 1991 at the Free University of Amsterdam and her PhD in 2001 at the University of Utrecht, the Netherlands. Presently, she is the assistant director of the Infant Psychology lab at the University of Utah. Her research interests include parent-child relationships, family-peer linkages and the role of the body in psychological functioning. She specifically focuses on the early development of the self, which she studies with both quantitative and qualitative methods.

FRANCESCA BELLAGAMBA completed her PhD in Developmental Psychology in 2000 at the University of Rome, investigating the relationship between self-awareness and other's intentionality-awareness in the second year of life. She has been collaborating with Drs Fogel (University of Utah), Camaioni (University of Rome) and Aureli (University of Palermo) on a longitudinal study about the emergence of shared reference in mother-infant communication. She spent the 2000-2001 academic year at the University of Utah as a research scholar under a Fulbright Fellowship.

HOLLY BELL is in her second year of the doctoral program in developmental psychology at the University of Utah, working with Dr Alan Fogel. Her interests are in investigating the relational process underlying the development of the self in infants ages 0-6 months. She is currently working on her master's thesis, a qualitative, single-case, historical analysis of self development.